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LIVESTOCK ODOR & NUISANCE ACTIONS VS. "RIGHT-TO-




As a farm boy, the breeding, rearing and marketing of live-
stock, including hogs, cattle, sheep, chickens and turkeys, pro-
duced memorable odors which probably were unpleasant, but
since they were necessary for the purpose of producing income,
they are now pleasant memories. Since then much time has
passed, and with more livestock, more people, more odors, and
shortages of friendliness and neighborliness, these odors today
pose a threat to livestock producers.
Nuisance laws have been used to prevent unreasonable emis-
sions of odor from livestock since 1610.1 The problems associated
with nuisance actions and the uncertainty resulting to the pro-
ducer pressured the legislatures of the United States to provide
alternative relief. The "right-to-farm" legislation is now available
to the producer in at least forty-nine states.2 Still, there are some
producers unable to avail themselves of the "right-to-farm" legisla-
tion who may become a defendant in a common law nuisance
action, with results leading to financial ruin or, at the very least,
financial distress.
This paper will discuss a private nuisance action involving a
confined sow-pig and finishing hog operation in Missouri defended
against neighbors' claims that the operation substantially inter-
fered with the use and enjoyment of their property. The neigh-
bors demanded a permanent injunction and damages for a
reduction in value of their property by use of the defendant's
land,3 a neighbor versus neighbor case.
* Private practitioner, 314 North 11th Street, Canton, Missouri; J.D., St. Louis
University, 1951.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Neil D. Hamilton,
Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa, 50311, for his nation-wide research on right-to-farm
actions.
1. Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Reports 816 (1610).
2. See Neil D. Hamilton & David Bolte, Nuisance Law and Livestock Production in the
United States: A Fifty-State Analysis, 10 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 99-136 (1988).
3. Hellebusch v. Glosemeyer, 1990, Circuit Court Warren County, Missouri upon jury
verdict for producer, July 1990, no appeal taken.
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II. COMMON LAW NUISANCE DOCTRINE
Common law nuisance doctrine emanates from the efforts of
our courts to reconcile the use of property with the personal com-
fort of others in close proximity to that property. The weighing of
equities involved requires a "feel" for the conditions, the people
involved, the area concerned, the respective financial conditions,
and the attitude of the trier of fact. Section 821F of the Second
Restatement of Torts sets forth the rule that there is liability for
nuisance only to those who are significantly harmed, a kind of
harm that would result to a normal person in the community.4
The rights of owners to use their land is geared to the commu-
nity. While raising hogs in London may be possible, it may not be
practical. Raising hogs in a community of farmers who raise cattle
might not be wise, but raising hogs in a community where hogs are
customarily raised will allow a substantial number of "normal per-
sons" to be present in the community. These "normal people" will
make up the juries, elect the judges, create public opinion and
generally reduce the "significant harm" that might result from the
release of occasional odors by the producer.
A nuisance may be of a public nature. Acts affecting a sub-
stantial number of the general public are generally classified as
public nuisances, distinguished from private nuisances, which gen-
erally affect only a few.5 The nuisance may be per se, temporary,
permanent, partial or complete.' Livestock odors are generally
not considered to be permanent nuisance, even though the odors
may be from a permanent structure, because such odors may be
abated by, among other things, conduct, activities, or termination.
There may be an abatement by injunctive relief, recovery of dam-
ages, or both, for significant harm resulting from the nuisance.
Money damages may be both actual and punitive.
A private nuisance action involving the production of hogs,
where negligence or improper activity is alleged, is a difficult case
to defend for the reason that there are no definite emission con-
trols or standards in most states. The Missouri Division of Natural
Resources attempted enforcement of odor control regulations, but
discontinued efforts primarily because of costs and inability to
establish clear and definitive rules and regulations. Generally,
health codes are not involved, since unpleasant odors from hog
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1979).
5. Id. § 821B.
6. Id. § 827.
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production are not health-threatening. Zoning laws in most areas
allow for agricultural activity, including the raising of hogs, but
provide no definitive regulations. Accordingly, a livestock pro-
ducer is left to the whims of a community, the juries, the courts,
and the uncertain results of nuisance litigation.
The theory of nuisance is based in tort, yet negligence is only
one type of conduct that can produce a nuisance. A person may
be strictly liable for certain conduct without negligence. The issue
is one of "reasonableness" of conduct. Each may use their prop-
erty in such a way as to cause some annoyance, but the conduct
must be reasonable under the circumstances.
Interference with the use of a person's land by another is a
civil wrong which may be remedied by the person harmed. Dam-
age to property may be recovered based on the loss of rental value
during the nuisance, loss of income on crops,7 or the permanent
diminution in value of the property.
Temporary damages are the ordinary measure for odor nui-
sances ( i.e., actual damages to date of trial).8 Punitive or exem-
plary damages can only be awarded when substantial actual
damages exist.9
The measure of damages for injury to real estate by nuisance
has generally been stated as follows:
Where the injury to real estate resulting from a nuisance
is permanent, the measure of damages is the depreciation
in the value of the property . .. [and], all damages, both
past and prospective, may be recovered.
Where the injury is temporary or remediable, the
measure of damages is not the depreciation of the value
of the property, but the depreciation of the rental or usa-
ble value during the continuance of the injury . . .and
damages as for a permanent injury cannot be allowed
where the injury is temporary or the nuisance
removable.10
A court of equity may temporarily enjoin, partially enjoin or
direct alternative methods or solutions to avoid a complete and
7. Weber v. I.M.T. Ins., 462 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1990). In Weber, the plaintiff was
allowed to recover for the loss of his sweet corn crop caused by the odor of manure which
the defendant-producer allowed to fall upon the roadway.
8. Ready v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 72 S.W. 142, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 1903).
9. Thompson v. Hodge, 348 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
10. 66 C.J.S. Nuisance § 175 (1950).
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permanent injunction. This, of course, requires proof that there is
no adequate or complete relief at law.
There are defenses to nuisance actions. The defense of con-
tributory negligence or assumption of risk may be used when neg-
ligent conduct of the defendant is claimed." The contribution of
others to the nuisance may not extinguish defendant's liability for
his own contribution.12 While the "coming to the nuisance" doc-
trine is not an absolute defense, it may be considered in determin-
ing whether the nuisance is actionable.' 3 The "right-to-farm" laws
may be a defense to a livestock odor case.
The "coming to the nuisance" doctrine is generally based on
the theory that there was an assumption of the risk. A person
building a residence in an area used for the raising of hogs may be
prohibited from later claiming that the hogs are causing odors that
should be abated. The doctrine is sharply disputed and has been
much debated.' 4 A discussion of the defense of coming to the nui-
sance which reviews both sides of the debate is found in a thor-
ough discussion of the right-to-farm by Margaret R. Grossman and
Thomas G. Fisher. 5
An action tried to a jury is, in effect, the trying of an action to
a zoning board, but usually injunctive relief is tried to a court. The
joining of a claim for damages with a claim for injunctive relief
may still leave the trial to a judge rather than a jury. Whether a
claim for injunctive relief and damages may be split and tried to
the court and jury simultaneously is debatable.' 6 The courts have
held that the injunction issues may be determined by a court of
equity.' 7 These courts of equity may continue to retain jurisdic-
tion of the case in order to grant damages where equity requires
such relief under circumstances to be determined without the
benefit of a jury.' This result is contradictory to the general rule
and constitutional provisions of most states guaranteeing a right to
trial by jury in common law actions. The better rule would seem
to be that where a court is confronted with claims for both equita-
ble relief and damages, the court would panel a jury who would
hear the evidence, decide the issue of damages, and leave to the
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1986).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840E (1979).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D (1979).
14. GREGORY, KALVERE & EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 616 (1977).
15. Margaret R. Grossman & Thomas C. Fischer, Protecting the Right to Farm:
Statutory Limits on Nuisance Actions Against the Farmer, 1983 WiS. L. REV. 95-165.
16. See State ex rel. Willman v. Sloan, 574 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1978).
17. Id at 422.
18. Id.
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court at the conclusion of the case the decision whether to grant
injunctive relief.
III. RIGHT-TO-FARM LAWS
A thorough review of the status of right-to-farm laws of each
state is found in Nuisance Law and Livestock Production in the
United States: A Fifty State Analysis by Professor Neil D. Hamil-
ton and David Bolte.' 9 The majority of the statutes are patterned
after section 106-700 of the North Carolina General Statutes.2 °
The right-to-farm doctrine is the result of pressure on the legisla-
tures to codify protection from nuisance actions involving live-
stock producers. Frequently the statutes produce more questions
than answers.
The Missouri right-to-farm law is found at section 537.295 of
the Missouri Annotated Statutes2 1 and was recently amended by
the legislature to extend protection to assignees of the land.22 The
new amendments of the Missouri Act also attempt to provide for a
reasonable expansion of agricultural operation after the protection
from the right-to-farm law has been obtained.
The plaintiffs in the Glosemeyer23 case consisted of persons
who "came to the nuisance" and persons who were present before
the commencement of the hog operation. The trial court deter-
mined that the right-to-farm law was inapplicable under those cir-
cumstances, even though the hog operation had been in operation
for more than one year before the commencement of litigation.
Arguments in the Glosemeyer trial that the right-to-farm act of
Missouri was a special statute of limitations prohibiting an action
after one year were unsuccessful.
An Indiana court determined that the right-to-farm act was
applicable retroactively. 24 In fact, the Indiana statute gives spe-
cific reference to the reason for the passage of the act.25 The stat-
ute states that the express purpose of the act is to prevent further
reduction and loss to the state of its agricultural resources by limit-
ing litigation under the nuisance doctrine.26
19. See Neil D. Hamilton & David Bolte, Nuisance Law and Livestock Production in
the United States: A Fifty-State Analysis, 10 J. AGRiC. TAX'N & L. 99-136 (1988).
20. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-700 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
21. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.295 (Vernon 1988 & Supp 1992).
22. See id. § 537.295(1) (Supp. 1992).
23. Hellebusch v. Glosemeyer, 1990, Circuit Court Warren County, Missouri upon jury
verdict for producer, July 1990, no appeal taken.
24. Shatto v. McNulty, 509 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
25. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-52-4 (Burns 1986).
26. Id.
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In situations where a state right-to-farm law provides that no
agricultural operation may be deemed a nuisance after it has been
in operation for more than one year, counsel for defendant should
argue that a nuisance action cannot be maintained unless negli-
gence of the operator is alleged. If a producer is freed from a pri-
vate nuisance theory by a right-to-farm law and liability is
predicated on a theory of negligence, the outcome of litigation
may be more easily predicted. Standards of care can be more
clearly defined and established by the evidence. When right-to-
farm acts are interpreted as precluding the application of the nui-
sance doctrine to the raising of livestock, a producer has a greater
opportunity to defend claims against unreasonable odors.
The right-to-farm law, although enacted in almost all states,
has not had the desired or intended effect in preventing nuisance
actions in livestock odor cases. In fact, case law indicates that
there have been few solutions to the burdensome doctrine of nui-
sance. The Iowa Legislature has attempted an additional form of
relief by the establishment of "agricultural areas."'27 The result of
the legislation has been a removal of litigation from the courts to
administrative law units, which may or may not protect to a
producer.
IV. THE ANATOMY OF A NUISANCE ACTION INVOLVING
LIVESTOCK ODORS
The most important decision to be made by the plaintiff prior
to litigation is a determination of the nature and extent of relief to
be sought. This decision will depend on all of the facts and the
location.
The Glosemeyer case review began in a small rural commu-
nity which for 150 years had been a tranquil farming area involved
in the production of livestock and grain on well-tended farmsteads
established by settlers of German ancestry. The county was within
commuting distance of a large urban area and was becoming a
bedroom community for people working in the city. Still, the area
around the producer was used predominantly for farming.
Discord developed in the community following the construc-
tion of confinement facilities for the finishing of hogs, using water
lagoons for the collection of livestock waste with the use of sprin-
kler irrigation systems to distribute the waste from the lagoons
onto pastures. The plaintiffs were led by a retired livestock pro-
27. IOWA CODE ANN. § 176B.1-13 (1990).
464 [Vol. 68:459
LIVESTOCK ODOR & NUISANCE ACTIONS
ducer in the community who had raised livestock for over fifty
years. He was joined by four other nearby homeowners. Several
livestock operations were closer, but many of those operations
were nonconfinement operations. Negotiations to avoid litigation
failed when the consulting engineer employed by the plaintiffs
demanded an aeration system for the lagoon comparable to
municipal waste disposal system lagoons. Studies by other experts
employed by the producer did not substantiate the claims of the
consulting engineer of the plaintiff. The lawsuit sought to abate
the alleged nuisance by terminating the operation in its entirety.
Claims for both punitive and actual damages were made.
The petition was filed in two counts; Count I for damages and
Count II for permanent injunction restraining further conduct of
the hog feeding operation. The plaintiffs' claim was based on
odors depreciating the value of their property and depriving them
the enjoyment of their home. General forms for the pleading of a
nuisance action are found in the legal encyclopedias.
A general denial was fied on behalf of defendants, with affirm-
ative defenses including statute of limitations, the right-to-farm
act, and wrongful interference with the business of the defend-
ants. The defendants' counterclaims alleged a willful intention to
destroy the defendants' business by various attempts to solicit
sales, businesses and others to boycott the business.
The principal pre-trial problem revolved around the issue of
whether the defendants were entitled to a jury trial on the issue of
damages and how the case would proceed on the injunctive relief
issues if the defendants were entitled to a jury trial. The trial court
ultimately resolved the issue in favor of the defendants, allowing a
jury to be panelled and hear the evidence as presented to the
court in all issues, with the court reserving the right to decide the
issues on the claim for injunction and submitting the issue of dam-
ages to the jury if the claim for injunction was denied. If the claim
on the injunction were to be granted, the court would retain the
case for a determination of any damages.
After ten days of trial and testimony from a consulting engi-
neer, real estate agents, other producers in the vicinity, and wit-
nesses as to the odor emanating from the premises of the
defendant, the trial judge found for the defendants on the claim
for injunction and the jury found for the defendants on the claim
for damages. No appeal was taken.
28. See 18A AM. JUR. PLEADING AND PRACTICE FORMS Nuisance (1986).
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The following experts were used in support of the defendants:
Chief of the Missouri DNR and an environmental specialist of the
DNR who had monitored the operation of the defendants at their
request; a University of Missouri chemist who had taken various
tests by the use of a device for measuring odor levels at various
points surrounding the defendants' operation; an agricultural engi-
neer concerning the design of the various hog raising facilities and,
in particular, the waste disposal facilities; doctors of veterinary
medicine who had treated the animals, as well as a University of
Missouri animal pathologist concerning tissue examination of ani-
mals and relationship to cleanliness and proper care of the ani-
mals; an extension economist; two certified real estate appraisers;
the executive director of the Missouri Pork Producers Association;
defendants' accountant; and swine consultants who were involved
in the feeding of the animals.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence in the case came from
twenty other producers who operated within a twenty-mile radius
of the defendants, with six of them in close proximity to the plain-
tiffs' property. The most important factor in the decision of both
the court and the jury was the defendants' ability to prove by
expert witnesses as well as by lay witnesses that the defendants'
operation was in compliance with all rules and regulations and was
operated in a careful manner with state of the art equipment and
designed facilities.
The litigation mght have been avoided had there been better
communication between the neighbors, but it was successfully
concluded in favor of the producer because of the proof of careful
management in using the best available means to reduce odors
from reaching into the atmosphere and interfering with the use of
plaintiffs' property.
466 [Vol. 68:459
